

# Efficient Quantum Key Distribution Scheme And Proof of Its Unconditional Security

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## Abstract

We devise a simple modification that essentially doubles the efficiency of the BB84 quantum key distribution scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard. We also prove the security of our modified scheme against the most general eavesdropping attack that is allowed by the laws of physics. The first major ingredient of our scheme is the assignment of significantly different probabilities to the different polarization bases during both transmission and reception, thus reducing the fraction of discarded data. A second major ingredient of our scheme is a refined analysis of accepted data: We divide the accepted data into various subsets according to the basis employed and estimate an error rate for each subset *separately*. We then show that such

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a refined data analysis guarantees the security of our scheme against the most general eavesdropping strategy, thus generalizing Shor and Preskill's proof of security of BB84 to our new scheme. Up till now, most proposed proofs of security of single-particle type quantum key distribution schemes have relied heavily upon the fact that the bases are chosen uniformly, randomly and independently. Our proof removes this symmetry requirement.

Keywords: Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution

## 1 Introduction

Since an encryption scheme is only as secure as its key, key distribution is a big problem in conventional cryptography. Public-key based key distribution schemes such as the Diffie-Hellman scheme [19] solve the key distribution problem by making computational assumptions such as that the discrete logarithm problem is hard. However, unexpected future advances in algorithms and hardware (e.g., the construction of a quantum computer [53, 54]) may render many public-key based schemes insecure. Worse still, this would lead to a *retroactive* total security break with disastrous consequences. This is because an eavesdropper may save a message transmitted in the year 2003 and wait for the invention of a new algorithm/hardware to decrypt the message decades later. A big problem in conventional public-key cryptography is that there is, in principle, nothing to prevent an eavesdropper with infinite computing power from passively monitoring the key distribution channel and thus successfully decoding any subsequent communication.

Recently, there has been much interest in using quantum mechanics in cryptography. (The subject of quantum cryptography was started by S. Wiesner [60] in a paper that was written in about 1970 but remained unpublished until 1983. For reviews on the subject, see [6, 25, 46].) The aim of quantum cryptography has always been to solve problems that are impossible from the perspective of conventional cryptography. This paper deals with quantum key distribution [4, 11, 21] whose goal is to detect eavesdropping using the laws of physics.<sup>1</sup> In quantum mechanics, measurement is not just a pas-

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<sup>1</sup>Another class of applications of quantum cryptography has also been proposed [5, 12]. Those applications are mainly based on quantum bit commitment and quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. However, it is now known [48, 42, 41, 38] that unconditionally secure

sive, external process, but an integral part of the formalism. Indeed, thanks to the quantum no-cloning theorem [18, 61], passive monitoring of unknown transmitted signals is strictly forbidden in quantum mechanics. Moreover, an eavesdropper who is listening to a channel in an attempt to learn information about quantum states will almost always introduce disturbance in the transmitted quantum signals [7]. Such disturbance can be detected with high probability by the legitimate users. Alice and Bob will use the transmitted signals as a key for subsequent communications only when the security of quantum signals is established (from the low value of error rate).

Although various QKD schemes have been proposed, the best-known one is still perhaps the first QKD scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard and published in 1984 [4]. Their scheme, which is commonly known as the BB84 scheme, will be briefly discussed in Section 3. Here it suffices to note two of its characteristics. First, in BB84 each of the two users, Alice and Bob, chooses for each photon between two polarization bases randomly (that is, the choice of basis is a random variable), *uniformly* (that is, with equal probability) and independently. For this reason, half of the times they are using different basis, in which case the data are rejected immediately. Consequently, the efficiency of BB84 is at most 50%. Second, a simple-minded error analysis is performed in BB84. That is to say, all the accepted data (those that are encoded and decoded in the same basis) are lumped together and a *single* error rate is computed.

In contrast, in our new scheme Alice and Bob choose between the two bases randomly, independently but *not* uniformly. In other words, the two bases are chosen with *substantially different* probabilities. As Alice and Bob are now much more likely to be using the same basis, the fraction of discarded data is greatly reduced, thus achieving a significant gain in efficiency. In fact, we are going to show in this paper that the efficiency of our scheme can be made asymptotically close to unity. (The so-called orthogonal quantum cryptographic schemes have also been proposed. They use only a single basis of communication and, according to Goldenberg, it is possible to use them to achieve efficiencies greater than 50% [22, 36]. Since they are conceptually rather different from what we are proposing, we will not discuss them here.)

Is the new scheme secure? If a simple-minded error analysis like the

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quantum bit commitment and unconditionally secure quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer are both impossible. Furthermore, other quantum cryptographic schemes such as a general two-party secure computation have also been shown to be insecure [38, 41]. For a review, see [17].

one that lumps all accepted data together were employed, an eavesdropper could easily break a scheme by eavesdropping mainly along the predominant basis. To ensure the security of our scheme, it is crucial to employ a refined data analysis. That is to say, the accepted data are further divided into two subsets according to the actual basis used by Alice and Bob and the error rate of each subset is computed *separately*. We will argue in this paper that such a refined error analysis is sufficient in ensuring the security of our improved scheme, against the *most general* type of eavesdropping attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics. This is done by using the technique of Shor and Preskill's proof [55] of security of BB84 — a proof that built on the earlier work of Lo and Chau [44] and of Mayers [49].

Our scheme is worth studying for several reasons. First, unlike the entanglement-based QKD scheme proposed by Lo and Chau in Ref. [44], the implementation of our new scheme does *not* require a quantum computer. It only involves the preparation and measurement of single photons as in standard BB84. Second, none of the existing schemes based on non-orthogonal quantum cryptography has an efficiency more than 50%. (We shall say a few word on the so-called orthogonal quantum cryptography in Section 6.) By showing in this paper that the efficiency of our new scheme can be made asymptotically close to 100%, we know that QKD can be made arbitrarily efficient. Our idea is rather general and can be applied to improve the efficiency of some other existing single particle based QKD schemes such as the six-state scheme[13, 40]). Note that the efficiency of quantum cryptography is of practical importance because it may play an important role in deciding the feasibility of practical quantum cryptographic systems in any future application. Third, our scheme is one of the few QKD schemes whose security have been rigorously proven. Finally, all previous proofs of security seem to rely heavily on the fact that the two bases are chosen randomly and uniformly. Our proof shows that such a requirement is redundant. Another advantage of our security proof is that it does not depend on asymptotic argument and hence can be applied readily to realistic situation involving only a relatively small amount of quantum signal transmission.

The organization of our paper is as follows. The basic features and the requirements of unconditional security will be reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, we will review the BB84 scheme and Shor-Preskill proof for completeness. Readers who are already familiar with the BB84 scheme and Shor-Preskill proof may browse through Section 2 and skip Section 3. An overview of our proof of security of an efficient QKD scheme will be given

in Section 4, which is followed by Section 5 which ties up some loose ends. Finally, we give some concluding remarks in Section 6.

## 2 Basic Features and Requirements of a Quantum Key Distribution Scheme

### 2.1 basic procedure

The aim of a QKD scheme is to allow two cooperative participants (commonly known as Alice and Bob) to establish a common secret key in the presence of noise and eavesdropper (commonly known as Eve) by exploiting the laws of quantum physics. More precisely, it is commonly assumed that Alice and Bob share a small amount of initial authentication information. The goal is then to expand such a small amount of authentication information into a long secure key. In almost all QKD schemes proposed so far, Alice and Bob are assumed to have access to a classical public unjammable channel as well as a quantum noisy insecure channel. That is to say, we assume that everyone, including the eavesdropper Eve, can listen to the conversations but cannot change the message that send through the public classical channel. In practice, an authenticated classical channel should suffice. On the other hand, the transmission of quantum signal can be done through free air [3, 14, 34] or optical fibers [30, 50, 59] in practice. The present state-of-the-art quantum channel for QKD can transmit signals up to a rate of  $4 \times 10^5$  qubits per second over a distance of about 10 km with an error rate of a few percent [14, 30, 59].<sup>2</sup> The quantum channel is assumed to be insecure. That is to say that the eavesdropper is free to manipulate the signal transmitted through the quantum channel as long as such manipulation is allowed by the known laws of physics.

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<sup>2</sup>In experimental implementations, coherent states with a Poisson distribution in the number of photons are often employed. To achieve unconditional security, it is important that the operational parameters are chosen such that the fraction of multi-photon signals is sufficiently small. This may substantially reduce the key generation rate[33]. In the current paper, we restrict our attention to perfect single photon signals as assumed in standard BB84 and various security proofs.

Using the above two channels, procedures in all secure QKD schemes we know of to date can be divided into the following three stages:

1. *Signal Preparation And Transmission Stage:* Alice and Bob separately prepare a number of classical and quantum signals. They may keep some of them private and transmit the rest to the other party using the secure classical and insecure quantum channels. They may iterate the signal preparation and transmission process a few times.
2. *Signal Quality Check Stage:* Alice and Bob then (use their private information retained in the signal preparation and transmission stage, the secure classical channel and their own quantum measurement apparatus to) test the fidelity of their exchanged quantum signals that have just been transmitted through the insecure and noisy quantum channel. Since a quantum measurement is an irreversible process some quantum signals are consumed in this signal quality check stage. The aim of their test is to estimate the noise and hence the upper bound for the eavesdropping level of the channel from the sample of quantum signals they have measured. In other words, the process is conceptually the same as a typical quantity control test in a production line — to test the quality of products by means of destructive random sampling tests. Alice and Bob abort and start all over again in case they believe from the result of their tests that the fidelity of the remaining quantum signal is not high enough. Alice and Bob proceed to the final stage only if they believe from the result of their tests that the fidelity of the remaining quantum signal is high.
3. *Signal Error Correction and Privacy Amplification Stage:* Alice and Bob need to correct errors in their remaining signals. Moreover, they would like to remove any residual information Eve might still have on the signals. In other words, Alice and Bob would like to distill from the remaining untested quantum signals a smaller set of almost perfect signals without being eavesdropped or corrupted by noise. We call this process privacy amplification. Finally, Alice and Bob make use of these distilled signals to generate their secret shared key.

## 2.2 security requirement

A QKD scheme is said to be secure if, for any eavesdropping strategy by Eve, either a) it is highly unlikely that the state will pass Alice and Bob's quality check stage or b) with a high probability that Alice and Bob will share the same key, which is essentially random and, furthermore, Eve has a negligible amount of information on their shared key.<sup>3</sup>

## 3 Bennett and Brassard's Scheme (BB84)

### 3.1 Basic idea of the BB84 scheme

We now briefly review the basic ingredients of the BB84 scheme and the ideas behind its security. Readers who are already familiar with BB84 and the Shor-Preskill proof may choose to skip this section to go directly to our biased scheme in Section 4. In BB84 [4], Alice prepares and transmits to Bob a batch of photons each of which is independently in one of the four possible polarizations: horizontal ( $0^\circ$ ), vertical ( $90^\circ$ ),  $45^\circ$  and  $135^\circ$ . For each photon, Bob randomly picks one of the two (rectilinear or diagonal) bases to perform a measurement. While the measurement outcomes are kept secret by Bob, Alice and Bob publicly compare their bases. They keep only the polarization data that are transmitted and received in the same basis. Notice that, in the absence of noises and eavesdropping interference, those polarization data should agree. This completes the signal preparation and transmission stage of the BB84 scheme. We remark that the laws of quantum physics strictly forbid Eve to distinguish between the four possibilities with certainty. This is because the two polarization bases, namely rectilinear and diagonal, are complementary observables and quantum mechanics forbids the simultaneous determination of the eigenvalues of complementary observables.<sup>4</sup> More

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<sup>3</sup>Naively, one might think that the security requirement should simply be: conditional on passing the quality check stage, Eve has a negligible amount of information on the key. However, such a strong security requirement is, in fact, impossible to achieve [49, 44]. The point is that a determined eavesdropper can always replace all the quantum signals from Alice by some specific state prepared by herself. Such a strategy will most likely fail in the quality check. But, if it is lucky enough to pass, then Eve will have perfect information on the key shared by Alice and Bob.

<sup>4</sup>Mathematically, observables in quantum mechanics are represented by Hermitian matrices. Complementary observables are represented by non-commuting matrices and, therefore, cannot be simultaneously diagonalized. Consequently, their simultaneous eigen-

importantly, any eavesdropping attack will lead to a disagreement in the polarization data between Alice and Bob, which can be detected by them through public classical discussion. More concretely, to test for tampering in the signal quality check stage, Alice and Bob choose a random subset of the transmitted photons and publicly compare their polarization data. If the quantum bit error rate (that is, the fraction of polarization data that disagree) is unreasonably large, they throw away all polarization data and start all over again. On the other hand, if the quantum bit error rate is acceptably small, they should then move on to the signal error correction and privacy amplification stage by performing public classical discussion to correct remaining errors.

Proving security of a QKD scheme turned out to be a very tricky business. The problem is that, in principle, Eve may have a quantum computer. Therefore, she could employ a highly sophisticated eavesdropping attack by entangling all the quantum signals transmitted by Alice. Moreover, she could wait to hear the subsequent classical discussion between Alice and Bob during both the signal quality check and the error correction and privacy amplification stages before making any measurement on her system.<sup>5</sup> One class of proofs by Mayers [49] and subsequently others [9, 10] proved the security of the standard BB84 directly. Those proofs are relatively complex. Another approach by Lo and Chau [39, 44] dealt with schemes that are based on quantum error-correcting codes. It has the advantage of being conceptually simpler, but requires a quantum computer to implement. These two classes of proofs have been linked up by the recent seminal work of Shor and Preskill [55], who provided a simple proof of security of the BB84 scheme. They showed that an eavesdropper is no better off with standard BB84 than a QKD scheme based on a specific class of quantum error-correcting codes. So long as from Eve's view, Alice and Bob *could have* performed the key generation by using their quantum computers, one can bound Eve's information on the key. It does not matter that Alice and Bob did not really use quantum computers.

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vectors generally do not exist.

<sup>5</sup>As demonstrated by the well-known Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, classical intuitions generally do not apply to quantum mechanics. This is a reason why proving security of QKD is hard.



## 3.2 entanglement purification

To recapitulate Shor and Preskill's proof, we shall first introduce a QKD scheme based on entanglement purification and prove its security. Our discussion in the next few subsections essentially combines those of Shor and Preskill[55] and Gottesman and Preskill[28].<sup>6</sup>

Entanglement purification was first proposed by Bennett, DiVincenzo, Smolin and Wootters (BDSW) [8]. Its application to QKD was first proposed by Deutsch *et al.* [20]. A convincing proof of security based on entanglement purification was presented by Lo and Chau [44]. Finally, Shor and Preskill[55] noted its connection to BB84.

Suppose two distant observers, Alice and Bob, share  $n$  impure EPR pairs. That is to say, some noisy version of the state

$$|\Phi^{(n)}\rangle = |\Phi^+\rangle^{\otimes n} \quad (1)$$

where  $|\Phi^+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$ . They may wish to distill out a smaller number, say  $k$ , pairs of perfect EPR pairs, by applying only classical communications and local operations. This process is called entanglement purification [8]. Suppose they succeed in generating  $k$  perfect EPR pairs. By measuring the resulting EPR pairs along a common axis, Alice and Bob can obtain a secure  $k$ -bit key.

Of course, a quality check stage must be added in QKD to guarantee the likely success of the entanglement purification procedure (for any eavesdropping attack that will pass the quality check stage with a non-negligible probability). A simple quality check procedure is for Alice and Bob to take a random sample of the pairs and measure each of them randomly along

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<sup>6</sup>There are some subtle differences between the original Shor and Preskill's proof and the one elaborated by Gottesman and Preskill. First, in the original Shor and Preskill's proof, Alice and Bob apply a simple-minded error rate estimation procedure in which they lump all polarization data of their test sample together into a single set and compute a single bit error rate. In contrast, in Gottesman and Preskill's elaboration, Alice and Bob separate the polarization data according to the bases in which they are transmitted and received. The two bit error rates for the rectilinear and diagonal bases are computed separately. In essence, they are employing the refined data analysis idea, which was first presented in a preliminary version of this manuscript [45]. Second, in Gottesman and Preskill's discussion, the final key is generated by measuring along a *single* basis, namely the  $Z$ -basis. (Because of this prescription, they call the error rates of the two bases simply bit-flip and phase errors. To avoid any potential confusion, we will not use their terminology here.) In contrast, in Shor and Preskill's original proof, the final key is generated from polarization data obtained in both bases.

either  $X$  or  $Z$  axis and compute the bit error rate (i.e., the fraction in which the answer differs from what is expected from an EPR pair). Suppose they find the bit error rates for the  $X$  and  $Z$  bases of the sample to be  $p_X$  and  $p_Z$  respectively. For a sufficiently large sample size, the properties of the sample provide good approximations to those of the population. Therefore, provided that the entanglement purification protocol that they employ can tolerate slightly more than  $p_X$  and  $p_Z$  errors in the two bases, we would expect that their QKD scheme is secure. This point will be proven in subsequent discussions in subsection 3.3.

Let us introduce some notations.

*Definition: Pauli operators.* We define a Pauli operator acting on  $n$  qubits to be a tensor product of individual qubit operators that are of the form  $I = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$ ,  $X = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$ ,  $Y = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -i \\ i & 0 \end{pmatrix}$  and  $Z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$ .

For example,  $\mathcal{P} = X \otimes I \otimes Y \otimes Z$  is a Pauli operator.

We shall consider entanglement purification protocols that can be conveniently described by *stabilizers*[23, 24]. A stabilizer is an Abelian group whose generators,  $M_i$ 's, are Pauli operators.

Consider a fixed but arbitrary  $[[n, k, d]]$  stabilizer-based quantum error-correcting code (QECC). The notation  $[[n, k, d]]$  means that it encodes  $k$  logical qubits into  $n$  physical qubits with a minimum distance  $d$ . As noted in [8], the encoding and decoding procedure of Alice and Bob can be equivalently described by a set of Pauli operators,  $M_i$ , with both Alice and Bob measuring the same operator  $M_i$ . To generate the final key from the encoded qubits, Alice and Bob eventually apply a set of operators, say  $\bar{Z}_{a,A}$  and  $\bar{Z}_{a,B}$  respectively, for  $a = 1, 2, \dots, k$ . In Shor and Preskill's proof, all Alice's (Bob's respectively) operators commute with each other.

If the  $n$  EPR pairs were perfect, Alice and Bob would obtain identical outcomes for their measurements,  $M_{i,A}$  and  $M_{i,B}$ . Moreover, because of the commutability of the operators, those measurements would not disturb the encoded operations,  $\bar{Z}_{a,A} \otimes \bar{Z}_{a,B}$ , each of which will give +1 as its eigenvalue for the state of  $n$  perfect EPR pairs. This is because measurements  $\bar{Z}_{a,A}$  and  $\bar{Z}_{a,B}$  produce the same +1 or -1 eigenvalues.

What about  $n$  noisy EPR pairs? Suppose Alice and Bob broadcast their measurement outcomes for  $M_{i,A}$  and  $M_{i,B}$  respectively. The product of their measurement outcomes of  $M_{i,A}$  and  $M_{i,B}$  gives the error syndrome of the state, which is now noisy. Since the original QECC can correct up to  $t \equiv \lfloor \frac{d-1}{2} \rfloor$  errors, intuitively, provided that the number of bit-flip and phase error

errors are each less than  $t$ , Alice and Bob will successfully correct the state to obtain the  $k$  encoded EPR pairs. Now, they can measure the encoded operations  $\bar{Z}_{a,A} \otimes \bar{Z}_{a,B}$  to obtain a secure  $k$ -bit key.

### 3.3 Reduction to Pauli strategy

*Definition: Correlated Pauli strategy.* Recall that a Pauli operator acting on  $n$  qubits is defined to be a tensor product of individual qubit operators that are of the form  $I$ ,  $X$ ,  $Y$  and  $Z$ . We define a correlated Pauli strategy,  $(\mathcal{P}_i, q_i)$ , to be one in which Eve applies only Pauli operators. That is to say that Eve applies a Pauli operator  $\mathcal{P}_i$  with a probability  $q_i$ .

The argument in the last subsection is precise only for a specific class of eavesdropping strategies, namely the class of correlated Pauli strategies. In this case, the numbers of bit-flip and phase errors are, indeed, well-defined. What about a general eavesdropping attack? In general, Alice and Bob's system is entangled with Eve's system. Does it still make any sense to say that Alice and Bob's system has no more than  $t$  bit-flip errors and no more than  $t$  phase errors? Surprisingly, it does. Instead of having to consider all possible eavesdropping strategies by Eve, it turns out that it is sufficient to consider the Pauli strategy defined above. In other words, one can assume that Eve has applied some Pauli operators, i.e., tensor products of single-qubit identities and Pauli matrices, on the transmitted signals with some *classical* probability distribution. More precisely, it can be shown that the fidelity of the recovered  $k$  EPR pairs is at least as big as the probability that i)  $t$  or fewer bit-flip errors and ii)  $t$  or fewer phase errors *would have* been found if a Bell-measurement had been performed on the  $n$  pairs.

Mathematically, the insight can be stated as the following theorem:

**Theorem 1 (from [28, 55, 44]):** Suppose Alice and Bob share a bipartite state of  $n$  pairs of qubits and they execute a stabilizer-based entanglement purification procedure that can be described by the measurement operators,  $M_i$ , with both Alice and Bob measuring the same  $M_i$ . Suppose further that the procedure leads to a  $[[n, k, d]]$  QECC which corrects  $t \equiv \lfloor \frac{d-1}{2} \rfloor$  bit-flip errors and also  $t$  phase errors. Then, the fidelity of the recovered state, after error correction, as  $k$  EPR pairs

$$F \equiv \langle \bar{\Phi}^{(k)} | \rho_R | \bar{\Phi}^{(k)} \rangle \geq \text{Tr} (\Pi_S \rho). \quad (2)$$

Here,  $\bar{\Phi}^{(k)}$  is the encoded state of  $k$  EPR pairs,  $\rho_R$  is the density matrix of the recovered state after quantum error correction,  $\rho$  is the density matrix

of the  $n$  EPR pairs before error correction and  $\Pi_S$  represents the projection operator into the Hilbert space, called  $\mathcal{H}_{\text{good}}$ , which is spanned by Bell pairs states that differ from  $n$  EPR pairs in no more than  $t$  bit-flip errors and also no more than  $t$  phase errors.

**Proof of Theorem 1:**

One can regard  $\rho$  as the reduced density matrix of some pure state  $|\Psi\rangle_{SE}$  which describes the state of the system,  $S$  and an ancilla (the environment,  $E$ , outside Alice and Bob's control). Now, in the recovery procedure, Alice and Bob couple some auxiliary reservoir,  $R$ , prepared in some arbitrary initial state,  $|0\rangle_R$ , to the system. Initially, let us decompose the pure state  $|\Psi\rangle_{SE} \otimes |0\rangle_R$  into a “good” component and a “bad” component, where the good component is defined as:

$$|\Psi_{\text{good}}\rangle = (\Pi_S \otimes I_{ER})|\Psi\rangle_{SE} \otimes |0\rangle_R \quad (3)$$

and the bad component is given by:

$$|\Psi_{\text{bad}}\rangle = ((I_S - \Pi_S) \otimes I_{ER})|\Psi\rangle_{SE} \otimes |0\rangle_R. \quad (4)$$

Now, the recovery procedure will map the two components,  $|\Psi_{\text{good}}\rangle$  and  $|\Psi_{\text{bad}}\rangle$ , unitarily into  $|\Psi'_{\text{good}}\rangle$  and  $|\Psi'_{\text{bad}}\rangle$ . Since the recovery procedure works perfectly in the subspace,  $\mathcal{H}_{\text{good}}$ , we have

$$|\Psi'_{\text{good}}\rangle = |\bar{\Phi}^{(k)}\rangle_S \otimes |junk\rangle_{ER}. \quad (5)$$

Let us consider the norm of the good component:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \Psi'_{\text{good}} | \Psi'_{\text{good}} \rangle &= \langle \Psi_{\text{good}} | \Psi_{\text{good}} \rangle \\ &= \text{Tr}(\Pi_S \rho). \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Now, the fidelity of the final state as an  $k$ -EPR pairs is given by:

$$F = {}_{SER} \langle \Psi' | (|\bar{\Phi}^{(k)}\rangle_S {}_S \langle \bar{\Phi}^{(k)}|) \otimes I_{ER} | \Psi' \rangle_{SER} \quad (7)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= {}_{SER} \langle \Psi'_{\text{good}} | (|\bar{\Phi}^{(k)}\rangle_S {}_S \langle \bar{\Phi}^{(k)}|) \otimes I_{ER} | \Psi'_{\text{good}} \rangle_{SER} \\ &+ {}_{SER} \langle \Psi'_{\text{bad}} | (|\bar{\Phi}^{(k)}\rangle_S {}_S \langle \bar{\Phi}^{(k)}|) \otimes I_{ER} | \Psi'_{\text{bad}} \rangle_{SER} \\ &+ {}_{SER} \langle \Psi'_{\text{good}} | (|\bar{\Phi}^{(k)}\rangle_S {}_S \langle \bar{\Phi}^{(k)}|) \otimes I_{ER} | \Psi'_{\text{bad}} \rangle_{SER} \\ &+ {}_{SER} \langle \Psi'_{\text{bad}} | (|\bar{\Phi}^{(k)}\rangle_S {}_S \langle \bar{\Phi}^{(k)}|) \otimes I_{ER} | \Psi'_{\text{good}} \rangle_{SER} \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \text{Tr} (\Pi_S \rho) \\
&\quad + {}_{SER} \langle \Psi'_{bad} | \left( |\bar{\Phi}^{(k)}\rangle_S {}_S \langle \bar{\Phi}^{(k)}| \right) \otimes I_{ER} | \Psi'_{bad} \rangle_{SER} \\
&\quad + {}_{SER} \langle \Psi'_{good} | \Psi'_{bad} \rangle_{SER} \\
&\quad + {}_{SER} \langle \Psi'_{bad} | \Psi'_{good} \rangle_{SER} \tag{9}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \text{Tr} (\Pi_S \rho) \\
&\quad + {}_{SER} \langle \Psi'_{bad} | \left( |\bar{\Phi}^{(k)}\rangle_S {}_S \langle \bar{\Phi}^{(k)}| \right) \otimes I_{ER} | \Psi'_{bad} \rangle_{SER} \tag{10}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\geq \text{Tr} (\Pi_S \rho) \tag{11}$$

where the orthogonality of the states,  $|\Psi'_{good}\rangle_{SER}$  and  $|\Psi'_{bad}\rangle_{SER}$ , is used in Eq. (10). Q.E.D.

### 3.4 quality check procedure

In the last subsection, we showed that, provided that a Bell measurement, if had been performed, would have shown that the numbers of bit-flip errors and phase errors are both no more than  $t$ , Alice and Bob will succeed in generating a secure key. In reality, there is no way for two distant observers, Alice and Bob, to verify such a condition directly. Fortunately, Alice and Bob can perform some quality check procedure by randomly sampling their pairs. We have the following Proposition:

**Proposition 1** ([44], **particularly, its supplementary notes VI**): Suppose Alice prepares  $N$  EPR pairs and sends a half of each pair to Bob via a noisy channel (perhaps controlled by Eve). Alice and Bob may randomly select  $m$  of those pairs and perform a random measurement along either the  $X$  or the  $Z$  axis. Suppose, for the moment, that they compute the bit error rates of the tested sample in the two bases separately, thus obtaining  $p_X^{sample}$  and  $p_Z^{sample}$ . Then, these two error rates are good estimates of those of the population (and therefore, also the remaining untested pairs). In particular, one can apply *classical* random sampling theory to estimate confidence levels for the error rates in the two bases for the population (and thus the untested pairs).

*Proof of Proposition 1:* Let us summarize the overall strategy of the proof. One imagines applying the mathematical operation of Bell measurements on the  $N$  imperfect EPR pairs before the error correction procedure, but *after* Eve's eavesdropping. Consider the resulting state. It could have been obtained by a different eavesdropping strategy on the part of Eve, which applies

Pauli operators to the N-EPR-pair state with some probability distribution. Finally, it suffices to consider only this limited class of eavesdropping strategies.

Let us consider the state of the  $N$  EPR pairs after Eve's eavesdropping attack. For each of the  $m$  tested pair along the  $Z$ -basis, consider the projection operators,  $P_{||}^{i,z}$  and  $P_{anti-||}^{i,z}$  for the two *coarse-grained* outcomes (parallel and anti-parallel) of the measurement performed on the  $i$ -th pair. Specifically,

$$\begin{aligned} P_{||}^{i,z} &= |00\rangle_i \langle 00|_i + |11\rangle_i \langle 11|_i \\ &= |\Phi^+\rangle_i \langle \Phi^+|_i + |\Phi^-\rangle_i \langle \Phi^-|_i, \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_{anti-||}^{i,z} &= |01\rangle_i \langle 01|_i + |10\rangle_i \langle 10|_i \\ &= |\Psi^+\rangle_i \langle \Psi^+|_i + |\Psi^-\rangle_i \langle \Psi^-|_i, \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

where  $|\Phi^\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle)$  and  $|\Psi^\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle \pm |10\rangle)$ .

Similarly, for each of the  $m$  test pair along the  $X$ -axis, consider the projection operators,  $P_{||}^{k,x}$  and  $P_{anti-||}^{k,x}$ , for the two *coarse-grained* outcomes (parallel and anti-parallel) of the measurement performed on the  $k$ -th tested pair. Namely,

$$\begin{aligned} P_{||}^{k,x} &= \frac{1}{4}(|0\rangle_k + |1\rangle_k) \otimes (|0\rangle_k + |1\rangle_k) (\langle 0|_k + \langle 1|_k) \otimes (\langle 0|_k + \langle 1|_k) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{4}(|0\rangle_k - |1\rangle_k) \otimes (|0\rangle_k - |1\rangle_k) (\langle 0|_k - \langle 1|_k) \otimes (\langle 0|_k - \langle 1|_k) \\ &= |\Phi^+\rangle_k \langle \Phi^+|_k + |\Psi^+\rangle_k \langle \Psi^+|_k, \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_{anti-||}^{k,x} &= \frac{1}{4}(|0\rangle_k + |1\rangle_k) \otimes (|0\rangle_k - |1\rangle_k) (\langle 0|_k + \langle 1|_k) \otimes (\langle 0|_k - \langle 1|_k) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{4}(|0\rangle_k - |1\rangle_k) \otimes (|0\rangle_k + |1\rangle_k) (\langle 0|_k - \langle 1|_k) \otimes (\langle 0|_k + \langle 1|_k) \\ &= |\Phi^-\rangle_k \langle \Phi^-|_k + |\Psi^-\rangle_k \langle \Psi^-|_k. \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

The above four equations clearly show that using local operations and classical communications only (LOCCs), Alice and Bob can effectively perform a coarse-grained Bell's measurement with these four projection operators.

Now, consider the operator,  $M_B$ , which represents a complete measurement along  $N$ -Bell basis. Since  $M_B$ ,  $P_{||}^{i,x}$ ,  $P_{anti-||}^{i,x}$ ,  $P_{||}^{k,z}$  and  $P_{anti-||}^{k,z}$  all refer

to a single basis (namely, the  $N$ -Bell basis), they clearly commute with each other. Therefore, they can be simultaneously diagonalized. Thus, a pre-measurement  $M_B$  by say Eve will in no way change the outcome for  $P_{||}^{i,x}$ ,  $P_{anti-||}^{i,x}$ ,  $P_{||}^{k,z}$  and  $P_{anti-||}^{k,z}$ . Therefore, we may as well consider the case when such a pre-measurement is performed. By doing so, we have reduced the most general eavesdropping strategy to a restricted class that involves only Pauli operators. Consequently, the problem of estimation of the error rates of the two bases is classical. Q.E.D.

We emphasize that the key insight of Proposition 1 is the “commuting observables” idea: Consider the set of Bell measurements,  $X \otimes X$  and  $Z \otimes Z$ , on all pairs of qubits. All such Bell measurements commute with each other. Therefore, without any loss of generality, we can assign classical probabilities to their simultaneous eigenstates and perform classical statistical analysis. This greatly simplifies the analysis.

More concretely, provided that total number of the EPR pairs goes to infinity, the classical de Finetti’s theorem applies to the random test sample of  $m$  pairs. Moreover, for a sufficiently large  $N$ , it is common in classical statistical theory to assume a normal distribution and use it to estimate the mean of the population and establish confidence levels. Therefore, with a high confidence level, for the remaining untested pairs, the error rates  $p_X^{untested} < p_X^{sample} + \varepsilon$  and  $p_Z^{untested} < p_Z^{sample} + \varepsilon$ .

The next question is: how do the two error rates (for the  $X$  and  $Z$  bases) relate to the bit-flip and phase errors in the underlying quantum error correcting code? Suppose, as in our discussion so far, Alice and Bob generate their final key by measuring along the  $Z$ -axis only. In this case, it should not be hard to see that the bit-flip error has an error rate  $p_Z^{untested}$  and the phase error has an error rate  $p_X^{untested}$ .

However, in BB84, it is common practice to allow Alice and Bob to generate the key by measuring each pair along either the  $X$  or  $Z$ -axis with uniform probabilities. Mathematically, as discussed in [55, 40], this is equivalent to Alice’s applying either i) a Hadamard transform or ii) an identity operator to the qubit before sending it to Bob. Therefore, in this case, it should not be too hard to see that the bit-flip error is given by the averaged error rate  $(p_X^{untested} + p_Z^{untested})/2$  of the two bases. Similarly, the phase error rate is given by the same expression. For this reason, it is, in fact, unnecessary in Shor and Preskill’s proof for Alice and Bob to compute the two error rates separately. In other words, a simple-minded error analysis in which they

lump all polarization data (from both rectilinear or diagonal bases) together and compute a single sample bit error rate, call it  $e^{sample}$  is sufficient for the quality check stage.

Now, suppose a QECC  $[[n, k, d]]$  is chosen such that the maximal tolerable error rate,  $e^{max} = \frac{t}{n} \equiv \frac{\lfloor (d-1)/2 \rfloor}{n} > e^{sample} + \varepsilon$ . Then, for any eavesdropping strategy that will pass the quality check stage with a non-negligible probability, it is most likely that the remaining untested  $n$  EPR pairs will have less than  $t$  bit-flip errors and also less than  $t$  phase errors. Therefore, the error correction will most likely succeed and Alice and Bob will share a  $k$ -EPR-pair state with high fidelity.

The following theorem shows that once Alice and Bob share a high fidelity  $k$ -EPR-pair state, then they can generate a key such that the eavesdropper's mutual information is very small.

**Theorem 2** ([44]): Suppose two distant observers, Alice and Bob, share a high fidelity  $k$ -EPR-pair state,  $\rho$ , such that  $\langle \Phi^{(k)} | \rho | \Phi^{(k)} \rangle > 1 - \delta$  where  $\delta \ll 1$  and they generate a key by measuring the state along say the  $Z$ -axis, then the eavesdropper's mutual information on the key is bounded by

$$S(\rho) < -(1-\delta) \log_2(1-\delta) - \delta \log_2 \frac{\delta}{(2^{2k}-1)} = \delta \times \left( \frac{1}{\log_e 2} + 2k + \log_2(1/\delta) \right) + O(\delta^2). \quad (16)$$

**Proof:** Let us recapitulate the proof presented in Section II of supplementary material of [44]. The proof consists of two Lemmas. Lemma A says that high fidelity implies low entropy. Lemma B says that the entropy is a bound to the eavesdropper's mutual information with Alice and Bob.

More concretely, Lemma A says the following: If  $\langle \Phi^{(k)} | \rho | \Phi^{(k)} \rangle > 1 - \delta$  where  $\delta \ll 1$ , then the von Neumann entropy satisfies  $S(\rho) < -(1-\delta) \log_2(1-\delta) - \delta \log_2 \frac{\delta}{(2^{2k}-1)}$ . Proof of Lemma A: If  $\langle \Phi^{(k)} | \rho | \Phi^{(k)} \rangle > 1 - \delta$ , then the largest eigenvalue of the density matrix  $\rho$  must be larger than  $1 - \delta$ . Therefore, the entropy of  $\rho$  is, bounded above by that of a density matrix,  $\rho_0 = \text{diag}(1 - \delta, \frac{\delta}{(2^{2k}-1)}, \frac{\delta}{(2^{2k}-1)}, \dots, \frac{\delta}{(2^{2k}-1)})$ , which has an entropy  $-(1 - \delta) \log_2(1 - \delta) - \delta \log_2 \frac{\delta}{(2^{2k}-1)}$ .

Lemma B, which is a corollary of Holevo's theorem [29], says the following: Given any pure state  $\phi_{A'B'}$  of a system consisting of two subsystems,  $A'$  and  $B'$ , and any generalized measurements  $X$  and  $Y$  on  $A'$  and  $B'$  respectively, the entropy of each subsystem  $S(\rho_{A'})$  (where  $\rho_{A'}$  is the reduced density matrix,  $\text{Tr}_{B'} |\phi_{A'B'}\rangle \langle \phi_{A'B'}|$ ) is an upper bound to the amount of mutual information between  $X'$  and  $Y'$ .



Now, Suppose Alice and Bob share a bipartite state  $\rho_{AB}$  of fidelity  $1 - \delta$  to  $k$  EPR pairs. By applying Lemma A, one shows that the entropy of  $\rho_{AB}$  is bounded by  $S(\rho) < -(1 - \delta) \log_2(1 - \delta) - \delta \log_2 \frac{\delta}{(2^{2k} - 1)}$ .

Let us now introduce Eve to the picture and consider the system consisting of the subsystem,  $A'$ , of Eve and the subsystem,  $B'$ , of combined Alice-Bob. (i.e.,  $B' = AB$ .) Let us consider the most favorable situation for Eve where she has perfect control over the environment. In this case, the overall (Alice-Bob-Eve) system wavefunction can be described by a pure state,  $\phi_{A'B'}$  where Eve controls  $A'$  and the combined Alice-Bob controls  $B'$ . By Lemma B, Eve's mutual information with Alice-Bob's system is bounded by  $(1 - \delta) \log_2(1 - \delta) - \delta \log_2 \frac{\delta}{(2^{2k} - 1)}$ . Q.E.D.

*Remark 1:* It is not too hard to see that Alice and Bob will most likely share a common key that is essentially random in the above procedure.

*Remark 2:* Suppose we limit the eavesdropper's information,  $I_{eve}$ , to be less than  $\varepsilon$ , Theorem 2 shows that, as the length,  $k$  of the final key increases, the allowed infidelity,  $\delta$ , of the state must decrease at least as  $O(1/k)$ .

## 3.5 reduction to BB84

Shor and Preskill considered a special class of quantum error correcting codes, namely Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes. They showed that a QKD that employs an entanglement purification protocol (EPP) based on a CSS code can be reduced to BB84. Let us follow their arguments in two steps.

### 3.5.1 from entanglement purification protocol to quantum error-correcting code protocol

From the work of BDSW [8], it is well known that any entanglement purification protocol with only one-way classical communications can be converted into a quantum error-correcting code. Shor and Preskill applied this result to an EPP-based QKD scheme. Let us recapitulate the procedure of an EPP-based QKD scheme. Alice creates  $N$  EPR pairs and sends half of each pair to Bob. She then measures the check bits and compares them with Bob. If the error rate is not too high, Alice then measures  $M_{i,A}$  and publicly announces the outcomes to Bob, who measures  $M_{i,B}$ . This allows Alice and Bob to correct errors and distill out  $k$  perfect EPR pairs. Alice and Bob then measure  $\bar{Z}_{a,A}$  and  $\bar{Z}_{a,B}$ , the encoded  $Z$  operators, to generate the key.

Note that, by locality, it does not matter whether Alice measures the check bits before or after she transmits halves of EPR pairs to Bob. Similarly, it does not matter whether Alice measures her syndrome (i.e., the stabilizer elements,  $M_{i,A}$ ) before or after the transmission. Now, if she measures her check bits before the transmission, it is equivalent to choosing a random BB84 state,  $|0\rangle, |1\rangle, |+\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle), |-\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)$ . If Alice measures her syndromes before the transmission, it is equivalent to encoding halves of  $k$  EPR pairs in an  $[[n, k, d]]$  QECC,  $\mathcal{C}_{s_A}$ , and sending them to Bob, where  $\mathcal{C}_{s_A}$  is the corresponding quantum code for the syndrome,  $s_A$ , she found.

Finally, suppose Alice measures her halves of the encoded  $k$  EPR pairs before the transmission, it is equivalent to Alice preparing one of the  $2^k$  mutually orthogonal codeword states in the quantum code,  $\mathcal{C}_{s_A}$ , to represent a  $k$ -bit key and sending the state to Bob. In summary, the above discussion reduces a QKD protocol based on EPP to a QKD protocol based on a class of  $[[n, k, d]]$  QECC,  $\mathcal{C}_{s_A}$ 's.

### 3.5.2 from error-correcting protocol to BB84

So far, we have not specified which class of QECCs to employ. Notice that, for a general QECC, the QECC protocol still requires quantum computers to implement (for example, the operators  $M_{i,A}$ ). Here comes a key insight of Shor and Preskill: If one employs Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [15, 57], then the scheme can be further reduced to standard BB84, which can be implemented *without* a quantum computer. CSS codes have the nice property that the bit-flip and phase error correction procedures are totally decoupled from each other. In other words, the error syndrome is of the form of a pair  $(s_b, s_p)$  where,  $s_b$  and  $s_p$  are respectively the bit-flip and phase error syndrome. Without quantum computers, there is no way for Alice and Bob to compute the phase error syndrome,  $s_p$ . However, this is not really a problem because phase errors do not change the value of the final key, which is all that Alice and Bob are interested in. For this reason, Alice and Bob can basically drop the phase-error correction procedure.

Let us first introduce the CSS code. Consider two classical binary codes,  $C_1$  and  $C_2$ , such that,

$$\{0\} \subset C_2 \subset C_1 \subset F_2^n, \quad (17)$$

where  $F_2^n$  is the binary vector space of the  $n$  bits and that both  $C_1$  and  $C_2^\perp$ , the dual of  $C_2$ , have a minimal distance,  $d = 2t + 1$ , for some integer,  $t$ . The

basis vectors of a CSS code,  $\mathcal{C}$ , are:

$$v \rightarrow |\psi(v)\rangle = \frac{1}{|C_2|^{1/2}} \sum_{w \in C_2} |v + w\rangle, \quad (18)$$

where  $v \in C_1$ . Note that, whenever  $v_1 - v_2 \in C_2$ , they are mapped to the same state. In fact, the basis vectors are in one-one correspondence with the cosets of  $C_2$  in  $C_1$ . The dimension of a CSS code is  $2^k$  where  $k = \dim(C_1) - \dim(C_2)$ . In standard QECC convention, the CSS code is denoted as an  $[[n, k, d]]$  QECC.

One can also construct a whole class of CSS codes,  $\mathcal{C}_{z,x}$ , from  $\mathcal{C}$ , where the basis vectors of  $\mathcal{C}_{z,x}$  are of the form

$$v \rightarrow |\psi(v)_{z,x}\rangle = \frac{1}{|C_2|^{1/2}} \sum_{w \in C_2} (-1)^{x \cdot w} |v + w + z\rangle, \quad (19)$$

where  $v \in C_1$ .<sup>7</sup>

Let us introduce some notation. Recall the definition of Pauli matrices. The operator  $\sigma_x$  corresponds to a bit-flip error,  $\sigma_z$  a phase error and  $\sigma_y$  a combination of both bit-flip and phase errors. It is convenient to denote the Pauli operator acting on the  $k$ -th qubit by  $\sigma_{a(k)}$  where,  $a \in \{x, y, z\}$ . Given a binary vector  $s \in F_2^n$ , let

$$\sigma_a^{[s]} = \sigma_{a(1)}^{s_1} \otimes \sigma_{a(2)}^{s_2} \otimes \cdots \sigma_{a(n)}^{s_n}. \quad (20)$$

By definition, the eigenvalues of  $\sigma_a^{[s]}$  are  $+1$  and  $-1$ .

Let  $H_1$  be the parity check matrix for the code  $C_1$  and  $H_2$  be the parity check matrix for  $C_2^\perp$ . For each row,  $r \in H_1$ , consider an operator,  $\sigma_z^{[r]}$ . Applying to a quantum state, their simultaneous eigenvalues give the bit-flip error syndrome. For each row,  $s \in H_2$ , consider an operator,  $\sigma_x^{[s]}$ . Applying to a quantum state, their simultaneous eigenvalues give the phase error syndrome. For instance, when applied to the state,  $\psi(v)$  in Eq. (19), we find the bit-flip error syndrome,  $s_b$ , and the phase error syndrome,  $s_p$  to be:

$$s_b = H_1(z), \quad s_p = H_2(x). \quad (21)$$

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<sup>7</sup>Note that our notation is different from both Refs. [55] and [28] in that we have interchanged  $x$  and  $z$  in Eq. (19) as well as in the definition of  $\mathcal{C}_{z,x}$ . In our notation,  $z$  denotes the bit-flip error syndrome and  $x$  denotes the phase error syndrome.

Let us look at the QECC-based QKD scheme as a whole. Alice is supposed to pick a random vector  $v \in C_1$ , random  $x_A$  and  $z_A$  and encode it as  $|\psi(v)_{z_A, x_A}\rangle$ . After Bob's acknowledgement of his receipt of the state, Alice then announces the values of  $x_A$  and  $z_A$  to Bob. Bob measures the state and obtains his own syndrome, the values of  $x_B$  and  $z_B$ . The relative syndrome, the values of  $x_A \times x_B$  and  $z_A \times z_B$ , is the actual error syndrome of the channel. Bob then corrects the errors and measures along the  $z$ -axis to obtain a string  $v + w + z_A$  for some  $w \in C_2$ . He then subtracts  $x_A$  to obtain  $v + w$ . Finally, Bob applies the generator matrix<sup>8</sup>,  $G_2$ , of the dual code  $C_2^\perp$  (i.e., the parity check matrix of the code  $C_2$ ) to generate the key,

$$G_2(v + w) = G_2(v) + G_2(w) = G_2(v). \quad (22)$$

Notice that the key is in one-one correspondence with the coset  $C_2$  in  $C_1$  because of the mapping  $G_2(v) \rightarrow v + C_2$ .<sup>9</sup>

Here comes the key point: Since Bob measures along the  $z$ -axis to generate the key, the phase errors really do not change the value of the key. Therefore, it is not necessary for Alice to announce the phase error syndrome,  $x_A$ , to Bob. Therefore, without affecting the security of the scheme, Alice is allowed to prepare a state  $\psi(v)_{z_A, x_A}$  and then discard, rather than broadcast the value of  $x_A$ . Equivalently, she is allowed to prepare an *averaged* state  $\psi(v)_{z_A, x_A}$  over all values of  $x_A$ . The averaging operation destroys the phase coherence and, from Eq. (19), leads to a classical mixture of  $|v + w + z_A\rangle$  in the  $z$ -basis.

As a whole, the error correction/privacy amplification procedure for the resulting BB84 QKD scheme goes as follows: Alice sends  $|u\rangle$  to Bob through a quantum channel. Bob obtains  $u + e$  due to channel errors. Alice later broadcasts  $u + v$ , for a random  $v \in C_1$ . Bob subtracts it from his received string to obtain  $v + e$ . He corrects the errors using the code  $C_1$  to obtain a codeword,  $v \in C_1$ . He then applies the matrix,  $G_2$ , to generate the final key  $G_2(v)$ , which is in one-one correspondence with a coset of  $C_2$  in  $C_1$ .

*Remark 3:* Upon reduction from CSS code to BB84, the original bit-flip error correction procedure of  $C_1$  becomes a classical error correction procedure. On the other hand, the phase error correction procedure becomes a privacy amplification procedure. (And, it is achieved by extracting the coset of  $C_2$  in  $C_1$  by using the generator matrix,  $G_2$ , of the dual code  $C_2^\perp$ .)

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<sup>8</sup>Gottesman and Preskill's paper stated that the parity check matrix,  $H_2$ , of the dual code  $C_2^\perp$  should be used. But, it should really be the generator matrix.

<sup>9</sup>This is a well-known result in classical coding theory.

*Remark 4:* Note that the crux of this reduction is to demonstrate that Eve’s view in the original EPP picture can be made to be exactly the same as in BB84. Therefore, the fact that Alice and Bob *could have* executed their QKD with quantum computers is sufficient to guarantee the security of QKD. They do not actually need quantum computers in the actual execution. Another way to saying what is going on is that Alice and Bob are allowed to *throw away* the phase error syndrome information without weakening security. By throwing such phase error syndrome away, the scheme becomes implementable with only classical computers, and, therefore, does not require quantum computers.

### 3.6 Acceptable error rate

If one only aims to decode noise patterns up to half of the minimal distance  $d$  (as in much of conventional coding theory), then, given that above quantum code uses  $C_1$  and  $C_2^\perp$  that have large minimal distances, it achieves the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound for CSS codes[15, 57]. As the length of the code,  $n$  goes to infinity, the number of encoded qubits goes to  $[1 - 2H(2e)]n$ , where  $e$  is the measured bit error rate in the quantum transmission. Here, the factor of 2 in front of  $H$  arises because one has to deal with both phase and bit-flip errors in a quantum code. In the classical analog, the factor of 2 in front of  $H$  does not appear. (The factor of 2 inside  $H$  ensures that the distance between any two codewords is at least twice of the tolerable error rate.)

However, in fact, the same CSS code can decode, with vanishing probability of error, up to *twice* of the above error rate. That is to say, it can achieve the quantum Shannon bound for *non-degenerate* codes. Asymptotically, the number of encoded qubits goes to  $[1 - 2H(e)]n$ . The maximal tolerable error rate would be about 11%.

The reason for the improvement is that the code only needs to correct the *likely* errors, rather than all possible errors at such a noise level. We remark that this is highly reminiscent of a result in classical coding theory which states that Gallager codes, which are based on very low density parity check matrices, can achieve the Shannon bound in classical coding theory[47]. In the classical case, the intuition is that in a very high-dimensional binary space, while two spheres of radius  $r$  whose centers are a distance  $d$  apart have a non-zero volume of intersection for any  $r$  greater than  $d/2$ , the *fractional* overlap is *vanishingly small* provided that  $r < d$ .

To achieve the Shannon bound in the quantum code case, it is necessary to ensure that the errors are randomly distributed among the  $n$  qubits. As noted by Shor and Preskill, this can be done by, for example, permuting the  $n$  qubits randomly.

*Remark 5:* In the original Mayers' proof, the maximal tolerable error rate is about 7%. As noted by Shor and Preskill, Mayers' proof has a hidden CSS code structure. Mayers considered some (efficiently decodable) classical codes,  $C_1$ , and a random subcode,  $C_2$ , of  $C_1$ . It turns out that, the dual,  $C_2^\perp$ , of a random subcode of  $C_1$  is highly likely to be a good code. However, Mayers' proof considered the correction of *all* phase errors, rather than *likely* phase errors within the error rate. For this reason, as the length,  $n$ , of the codeword goes to infinity, the number of encoded qubits asymptotically approaches  $[1 - H(e) - H(2e)]n$ , the first  $H$  comes from error correction and the second comes from privacy amplification. Thus, key generation is possible only up to 7%. Shor and Preskill extended Mayers' proof by noting that it is necessary to correct only *likely* phase errors, but not all phase errors within the error rate. They also randomize the errors by adding the permutation step mentioned in the above paragraphs.

### 3.7 Shor and Preskill's protocol of BB84

In the last few subsections, we have already discussed the main steps of Shor and Preskill's proof. For completeness, we will list here all the steps of Shor and Preskill's protocol of BB84 scheme.

- (1) Alice sends a sequence of say  $(4 + \delta_1)n$ , where  $\delta_1$  is a small positive number, photons each in one of the four polarizations (horizontal, vertical, 45 degrees and 135 degrees) chosen randomly and independently.
- (2) For each photon, Bob chooses the type of measurement randomly: along either the rectilinear or diagonal bases.
- (3) Bob records his measurement bases and the results of the measurements.
- (4) Subsequently, Bob announces his bases (but *not* the results) through the public unjammable channel that he shares with Alice.

*Remark 6:* Notice that it is crucial that Bob announces his basis only after his measurement. This ensures that during the transmission of the signals through the quantum channel the eavesdropper Eve does not know which basis to eavesdrop along. Otherwise, Eve can avoid detection simply by measuring along the same basis used by Bob.

(5) Alice tells Bob which of his measurements have been done in the correct bases.

(6) Alice and Bob divide up their polarization data into two classes depending on whether they have used the same basis or not.

*Remark 7:* Notice that on average, Bob should have performed the wrong type of measurements on half of the photons. Here, by a wrong type of measurement we mean that Bob has used a basis different from that of Alice. For those photons, he gets random outcomes. Therefore, he throws away those polarization data. We emphasize that this immediately implies that half of the data are thrown away and the efficiency of BB84 is bounded by 50%.

With high probability, at least  $\approx 2n$  photons are left. (If not, they abort.) Assuming that no eavesdropping has occurred, all the photons that are measured by Bob in the correct bases should give the same polarizations as prepared by Alice. Besides, Bob can determine those polarizations by his own detectors without any communications from Alice. Therefore, those polarization data are a candidate for their raw key. However, before they proceed any further, it is crucial that they test for tampering. For instance, they can use the following simplified method for estimating the error rate. (Going through BB84 would give us essentially the same result, namely that all accepted data are lumped together to compute a *single* error rate.)

(7) Alice and Bob randomly pick a subset of photons from those that are measured in the correct bases and publicly compare their polarization data for preparation and measurement. For instance, they can use  $\approx n$  photons for such testing. For those results, they estimate the error rate for the transmission. Of course, since the polarization data of photons in this subset have been announced, Alice and Bob must sacrifice those data to avoid information leakage to Eve.

We assume that Alice and Bob have some idea on the channel characteristics. If the average error rate  $\bar{e}$  turns out to be unreasonably large (i.e.,  $\bar{e} \geq e_{\max}$  where  $e_{\max}$  is the maximal tolerable error rate), then either substantial eavesdropping has occurred or the channel is somehow unusually noisy. In both cases, all the data are discarded and Alice and Bob may re-start the whole procedure again. Notice that, even then there is no loss in security because the compromised key is never used to encipher sensitive data. Indeed, Alice and Bob will derive a key from the data only when the security of the polarization data is first established.

On the other hand, if the error rate turns out to be reasonably small (i.e.,

$\bar{e} < e_{\max}$ ), they go to the next step.

(8) Reconciliation and privacy amplification: Alice and Bob can independently convert the polarizations of the remaining  $n$  photons into a *raw* key by, for example, regarding a horizontal or 45-degree photon as denoting a ‘0’ and a vertical or 135-degree photon a ‘1’.

Alice and Bob pick a CSS code based on two classical binary codes,  $C_1$  and  $C_2$ , as in Eqs. (17) and (18), such that both  $C_1$  and  $C_2^\perp$ , the dual of  $C_2$ , correct up to  $t$  errors where  $t$  is chosen such that the following procedure of error correction and privacy amplification will succeed with a high probability.

(8.1) Let  $v$  be Alice’s string of the remaining  $n$  unchecked bits.

Alice picks a random codeword  $u \in C_1$  and publicly announces  $u + v$ .

(8.2) Let  $v + \Delta$  be Bob’s string of the remaining  $n$  unchecked bits. (It differs from Alice’s string due to the presence of errors  $\Delta$ .) Bob subtracts Alice’s announced string  $u + v$  from his own string to obtain  $u + \Delta$ , which is a corrupted version of  $u$ . Using the error correcting property of  $C_1$ , Bob recovers a codeword,  $u$ , in  $C_1$ .

(8.3) Alice and Bob use the coset of  $u + C_2$  as their key.

*Remark 8:* As noted before, there is a minor subtlety [55]. To tolerate a higher channel error rate of up to about 11%, Alice should apply a random permutation to the qubits before their transmission to Bob. Bob should then apply the inverse permutation before decoding.

*Remark 9:* Depending on the desired security level, the number of test photons in Step (7) can be made to be much smaller than  $n$ . If one takes the limit that the probability that Eve can break the system is fixed but arbitrary, then the number of test photons can be made to be of order  $\log n$  only. On the other hand, if the probability that Eve can break the system is chosen to be exponentially small in  $n$ , then it is necessary to test order  $n$  photons.

## 4 Overview of efficient BB84

In this section, we will give an overview of the efficient BB84 scheme and provide a sketch of a simple proof of its security.



## 4.1 bias

The first major new ingredient of our efficient BB84 scheme is to put a bias in the probabilities of choosing between the two bases.

Recall the fraction of rejected data of BB84 is likely to be at least 50%. This is because in BB84 Alice and Bob choose between the two bases randomly and independently. Consequently, on average Bob performs a wrong type of measurement half of the time and, therefore, half of the photons are thrown away immediately. The efficiency will be increased if Alice prepares and Bob measures their photons with a biased choice of basis. Specifically, they first agree on a fixed number  $0 < p \leq 1/2$ . Alice prepares (Bob measures) each photon randomly, independently in the rectilinear and diagonal basis with probabilities  $p$  and  $1 - p$  respectively. Clearly, the scheme is insecure when  $p = 0$ . Nonetheless, we shall show that in the limit of large number of photon transfer, this biased scheme is secure in the limit of  $p \rightarrow 0^+$ . Hence, the efficiency of this biased scheme is asymptotically doubled when compared to BB84.

Notice also that the bias in the probabilities might be produced passively by an apparatus, for example, an unbalanced beamsplitter in Bob's side. Such a passive implementation based on a beamsplitter eliminates the need for fast switching between different polarization bases and is, thus, useful in experiments. This may not be obvious to the readers why a beamsplitter can create a probabilistic implementation. If one uses a beamsplitter, rather than a fast switch, one gets a superposition of states and not a mixture. However, provided that the subsequent measurement operators annihilate any state transmitting in one of the two paths, the probabilities of the outcomes will be the same for either a mixture or a superposition. More concretely, suppose one can model the problem by decomposing the Hilbert space into two subspaces  $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{H}_1 \oplus \mathcal{H}_2$  where  $\mathcal{H}_1$  is the Hilbert subspace corresponding to the first path and  $\mathcal{H}_2$  the second respectively. Consider the two sets of measurement operators,  $\{P_i\}$ 's and  $\{Q_j\}$ 's respectively, where  $P_i|\psi\rangle = 0$  for all  $|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_2$  and  $Q_j|\psi\rangle = 0$  for all  $|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_1$ . Let us write  $|u\rangle = |u_1\rangle + |u_2\rangle$  where  $|u_1\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_1$  and  $|u_2\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_2$ .

Now, the probability of the outcome corresponding to the measurement  $P_i$  is given by

$$|\langle u|P_i|u\rangle| = |\langle u_1|P_i|u_1\rangle| \quad (23)$$

and the probability of the outcome corresponding to the measurement  $Q_j$  is

given by

$$|\langle u|Q_j|u\rangle| = |\langle u_2|Q_j|u_2\rangle|. \quad (24)$$

Those probabilities are exactly the same as those given by a mixture of  $|u_1\rangle$  and  $|u_2\rangle$ .

## 4.2 Refined Error Analysis

In the original BB84 scheme, all the accepted data (those for which Alice and Bob measure along the same basis) are lumped together to compute a *single* error rate. In this subsection, we introduce the second major ingredient of our scheme — a refined error analysis. The idea is for Alice and Bob to divide up the accepted data into two subsets according to the actual basis (rectilinear or diagonal) used. After that, a random subset of photons is drawn from each of the two sets. They then publicly compare their polarization data and from there estimate the error rate for each basis *separately*. They decide that the run is acceptable if and only if both error rates are sufficiently small.

The requirement of having estimated error rates separately in both bases to be small is more stringent than the original one. In fact, if a naive data analysis, where only a single error rate is computed by Alice and Bob, had been employed, our new scheme would have been insecure. To understand this point, consider the following example of a so-called biased eavesdropping strategy by Eve.

For each photon, Eve 1) with a probability  $p_1$  measures its polarization along the rectilinear basis and resends the result of her measurement to Bob; 2) with a probability  $p_2$  measures its polarization along the diagonal basis and resends the result of her measurement to Bob; and 3) with a probability  $1 - p_1 - p_2$ , does nothing. We remark that, by varying the values of  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ , Eve has a whole class of eavesdropping strategies. Let us call any of the strategies in this class a biased eavesdropping attack.

Consider the error rate  $e_1$  for the case when both Alice and Bob use the rectilinear basis. For the biased eavesdropping strategy under current consideration, errors occur only if Eve uses the diagonal basis. This happens with a *conditional* probability  $p_2$ . In this case, the polarization of the photon is randomized, thus giving an error rate  $e_1 = p_2/2$ . Similarly, errors for the diagonal basis occur only if Eve is measuring along the rectilinear basis. This happens with a conditional probability  $p_1$  and when it happens, the photon polarization is randomized. Hence, the error rate for the diagonal basis

$e_2 = p_1/2$ . Therefore, Alice and Bob will find, for the biased eavesdropping attack, that the average error rate

$$\bar{e} = \frac{p^2 e_1 + (1-p)^2 e_2}{p^2 + (1-p)^2} = \frac{p^2 p_2 + (1-p)^2 p_1}{2[p^2 + (1-p)^2]}. \quad (25)$$

Suppose Eve always eavesdrops solely along the diagonal basis (i.e.,  $p_1 = 0$  and  $p_2 = 1$ ), then

$$\bar{e} = \frac{p^2}{2[p^2 + (1-p)^2]} \rightarrow 0 \quad (26)$$

as  $p$  tends to 0. Hence, with the original error estimation method in BB84, Alice and Bob will fail to detect eavesdropping by Eve. Yet, Eve will have much information about Alice and Bob's raw key as she is always eavesdropping along the dominant (diagonal) basis. Hence, a naive error analysis fails miserably.

In contrast, the refined error analysis can make our scheme secure against such a biased eavesdropping attack. Recall that in a refined error analysis, the two error rates are computed *separately*. The key observation is that these two error rates  $e_1 = p_2/2$  and  $e_2 = p_1/2$  depend only on Eve's eavesdropping strategy, but *not* on the value of  $\varepsilon$ . This is so because they are *conditional* probabilities. Consequently, in the case that Eve is always eavesdropping along the dominant (i.e., diagonal) basis, Alice and Bob will find an error rate of  $e_1 = p_2/2 = 1/2$  for the rectilinear basis. Since  $1/2$  is substantially larger than  $e_{max}$ , Alice and Bob will successfully catch Eve.

### 4.3 Procedure of efficient QKD

We now give the complete procedure of an efficient QKD scheme. Its security will be discussed in Subsection 4.4 and more details of a proof of its security will be given in Section 5.

#### Protocol E: Protocol for efficient QKD

(1) Alice and Bob pick a number  $0 < p \leq 1/2$  whose value is made public. Let  $N$  be a large integer. Alice sends a sequence of  $N$  photons to Bob. For each photon Alice chooses between the two bases, rectilinear and diagonal, with probabilities  $p$  and  $1-p$  respectively. The value of  $p$  is chosen so that  $N(p^2 - \delta') = m_1 = \Omega(\log N)$ , where  $\delta'$  is some small positive number and  $m_1$  is the number of test photons in the rectilinear basis in Step (7).

(2) Bob measures the polarization of each received photon independently along the rectilinear and diagonal bases with probabilities  $p$  and  $1 - p$  respectively.

(3) Bob records his measurement bases and the results of the measurements.

(4) Bob announces his bases (but *not* the results) through the public unjammable channel that he shares with Alice.

(5) Alice tells Bob which of his measurements have been done in the correct bases.

(6) Recall that each of Alice and Bob uses one of the two bases — rectilinear and diagonal. Alice and Bob divide up their polarization data into four cases according to the actual bases used. They then throw away the two cases when they have used different bases. The remaining two cases are kept for further analysis.

(7) From the subset where they both use the rectilinear basis, Alice and Bob randomly pick a fixed number say  $m_1$  photons and publicly compare their polarizations. (Since  $N(p^2 - \delta') = m_1$ , for a large  $N$ , it is highly likely that at least  $m_1$  photons are transmitted and received in the rectilinear basis. If not, they abort.) The number of mismatches  $r_1$  tells them the estimated error rate  $e_1 = r_1/m_1$ . Similarly, from the subset where they both use the diagonal basis, Alice and Bob randomly pick a fixed number say  $m_2$  photons and publicly compare their polarizations. The number of mismatches  $r_2$  gives the estimated error rate  $e_2 = r_2/m_2$ .

Provided that the test samples  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  are sufficiently large, the estimated error rates  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  should be rather accurate. As will be given in Subsection 5.4,  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  should be at least of order  $\Omega(\log k)$ , where  $k$  is the length of the final key. Now they demand that  $e_1, e_2 < e_{\max} - \delta_e$  where  $e_{\max}$  is a prescribed maximal tolerable error rate and  $\delta_e$  is some small positive parameter. If these two independent constraints are satisfied, they proceed to step (8). Otherwise, they throw away the polarization data and re-start the whole procedure from step (1).

(8) Reconciliation and privacy amplification: For simplicity, in what follows, we will take  $m_1 = m_2 = N(p^2 - \delta')$ . Alice and Bob randomly pick  $n = N[(1-p)^2 - p^2 - \delta']$  photons from those untested photons that are transmitted and received in the diagonal basis. Alice and Bob then independently convert the polarizations of those  $n$  photons into a *raw* key by, for example, regarding a 45-degree photon as denoting a ‘0’ and a 135-degree photon a ‘1’.

*Remark 10:* Note that the raw key is generated by measuring along a single basis, namely the diagonal basis. This greatly simplifies the analysis without compromising efficiency or security.

Alice and Bob pick a CSS code based on two classical binary codes,  $C_1$  and  $C_2$ , as in Eqs. (17) and (18), such that both  $C_1$  and  $C_2^\perp$ , the dual of  $C_2$ , correct up to  $t$  errors where  $t$  is chosen such that the following procedure of error correction and privacy amplification will succeed with a high probability.

(8.1) Let  $v$  be Alice's string of the remaining  $n$  unchecked bits.

Alice picks a random codeword  $u \in C_1$  and publicly announces  $u + v$ .

(8.2) Let  $v + \Delta$  be Bob's string of the remaining  $n$  unchecked bits. (It differs from Alice's string due to the presence of errors  $\Delta$ .) Bob subtracts Alice's announced string  $u + v$  from his own string to obtain  $u + \Delta$ , which is a corrupted version of  $u$ . Using the error correcting property of  $C_1$ , Bob recovers a codeword,  $u$ , in  $C_1$ .

(8.3) Alice and Bob use the coset of  $u + C_2$  as their key.

*Remark 11:* As noted before, there is a minor subtlety [55]. To tolerate a higher channel error rate of up to about 11%, Alice should apply a random permutation to the qubits before their transmission to Bob. Bob should then apply the inverse permutation before decoding.

## 4.4 Outline proof of Security of efficient QKD scheme

In this subsection, we will give the general strategy of proving the unconditional security of efficient QKD scheme and discuss some subtleties. Some loose ends will be tightened in Section 5.

First of all, we would like to derive the relationship between the error rates in the two bases ( $X$  and  $Z$ ) in biased BB84 and the bit-flip and phase error rates in the underlying entanglement purification protocol (EPP). Actually, this depends on how the key is generated. If the key is generated only from polarization data in say the  $Z$ -basis, then clearly, the bit-flip error rate is simply the  $Z$ -basis bit error rate and the phase error rate is simply the  $X$ -basis bit error rate. On the other hand, if the key is generated only from polarization data in say the  $X$ -basis, then the bit-flip error rate is simply the  $X$ -basis bit error rate and the phase error rate is simply the  $Z$ -basis bit error rate.

More generally, if a key is generated by making a fraction,  $q$ , of the measurements along the  $Z$ -basis and a fraction,  $1 - q$ , along the  $X$ -basis, then the bit-flip and phase error rates are given by weighted averages of the

bit error rates of the two bases:

$$\begin{aligned} e^{bit-flip} &= qe_1 + (1 - q)e_2 \\ e^{phase} &= qe_1 + (1 - q)e_2, \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

where  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  are the bit error rates of the  $Z$  and the  $X$  bases respectively.

Now, in a refined data analysis, Alice and Bob separate data from the two bases into two sets and compute the error rates in the two sets individually. This gives them individual estimates on the bit error rates,  $e_1$  and  $e_2$ , of the  $Z$  and  $X$  bases respectively. They demand that both error rates must be sufficiently small, say,

$$0 \leq e_1, e_2 < e_{max} - \delta_e. \tag{28}$$

From Eqs. (27), we see that, provided that the bit error rates of the  $X$  and  $Z$  bases are sufficiently small (such that Eqs. (28) are satisfied), we have

$$0 \leq e^{bit-flip}, e^{phase} < 11\%, \tag{29}$$

which says that both bit-flip and phase-flip signal error rates of the underlying EPP are small enough to allow CSS code to correct. Therefore, Shor and Preskill's argument carries over directly to establish the security of our efficient QKD scheme, if Alice and Bob apply a refined data analysis. This completes our sketch of the proof of security.

We remark that the error correction and privacy amplification procedure that we use are exactly the same as in Shor-Preskill's proof. The point is the following: Once the error rate for both the bit-flip and phase errors are shown to be correctable by a quantum (CSS) code, the procedure for error correction and privacy amplification in their proof can be carried over directly to our new scheme.

## 4.5 practical issues

Several complications deserve attention. First, Alice and Bob only have estimators of  $e_1$  and  $e_2$ , the bit error rates of the two bases, from their random sample. They need to establish confidence levels on the actual bit error rates of the population (or more precisely, those of the *untested* signals) from those estimators. Second, Alice and Bob are interested in the bit-flip and phase error rates of the EPP, rather than the bit error rates of the two-bases. Some conversion of the confidence levels has to be done. Given that

the two bases are weighted differently, such a conversion looks non-trivial. Third, Alice and Bob have to deal with finite sample and population sizes whereas many statistics textbooks takes the limit of infinite population size. Indeed, it is commonplace in statistics textbooks to take the limit of infinite population size and, therefore, assume a normal distribution. Furthermore, in practice, Alice and Bob are interested in bounds, not approximations (which might over-estimate or under-estimate) which many statistics textbooks are contented with.

Another issue: it is useful to specify the constraints on the bias parameter,  $q$ , and the size of the test samples,  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ . Indeed, in order to demonstrate the security of an efficient scheme for QKD, it is important to show that the size of the test sample can be a very small fraction of the total number of transmitted photons.

We shall present some basic constraints here. As will be shown in Section 5, these basic constraints turn out to be the most important ones. We see from Remark 2 that, if one limits the eavesdropper's information,  $I_{eve}$ , to less than a small fixed amount, then, as the length,  $k$ , of the key increases, the allowed infidelity in Theorem 2,  $\delta$ , of the state must decrease at least as  $O(1/k)$ . Suppose  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  signals are tested for the two different bases respectively, it is quite clear that  $\delta$  is at least  $e^{O(m_i)}$ . This leads to a constraint that  $m_i$  is at least  $\Omega(\log k)$ .<sup>10</sup> Suppose  $N$  photons are transmitted and Alice sends photons along the rectilinear and diagonal bases with probabilities,  $p$  and  $1 - p$  respectively. Then, the average number of particles available for testing along the rectilinear basis is only  $Np^2$ . Imposing that  $m_i$  is no more than order  $Np^2$ , we obtain  $Np^2 = \Omega(\log k)$ .

## 5 Details of Proof of security of efficient QKD

We will now tighten some of the loose ends in the proof of unconditional security of our efficient QKD protocol, Protocol E.

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<sup>10</sup>Notice that this constraint is *weaker* than the usual constraint of  $m_i = \Omega(N)$  imposed by various other proofs[49, 10]. In the next section, we will see that it is, indeed, unnecessary to impose  $m_i = \Omega(N)$ .

## 5.1 Using only one basis to generate the raw key

Recall that, in a refined data analysis, Alice and Bob separate data from the two bases into two sets and compute the error rates in the two sets individually. This gives them individual estimates on the bit error rates,  $e_1$  and  $e_2$ , of the  $Z$  and  $X$  bases respectively. Alice and Bob demand that both error rates must be sufficiently small, say,

$$0 \leq e_1, e_2 < e_{max} - \delta_e, \quad (30)$$

where  $\delta_e$  is some small positive parameter. From the work of Shor-Preskill,  $e_{max}$  is about 11%.

We would like to derive the relationship between the error rates in the two bases ( $X$  and  $Z$ ) in biased BB84 and the bit-flip and phase error rates in the underlying entanglement purification protocol (EPP). Actually, this depends on how the key is generated. In our protocol E, the raw key is generated only from polarization data in the  $X$ -basis (diagonal basis), the bit-flip error rate is simply the  $X$ -basis bit error rate and the phase error rate is simply the  $Z$ -basis (rectilinear basis) bit error rate. Therefore, no non-trivial conversion between the error rates of the two bases and the bit-flip and phase error rates needs to be performed. This greatly simplifies our analysis without compromising the efficiency nor security of the scheme.

Therefore, we have:

$$0 \leq e_{sample}^{phase}, e_{sample}^{bit-flip} < e_{max} - \delta_e, \quad (31)$$

where  $\delta_e$  is some small positive parameter and  $e_{max}$  is about 11%.

## 5.2 Using classical random sampling theory to establish confidence levels

A main point of Shor-Preskill's proof is that the bit-flip and phase error rates of the random sample provide good estimates of the population bit-flip and phase error rates. Indeed, our refined data analysis, as presented in [43] and earlier version of the current paper, has been employed by Gottesman and Preskill [28] in their recapitulation of Shor and Preskill's proof. Gottesman and Preskill assumed that Alice and Bob generate the key by always measuring along the  $Z$ -axis. We remark that the problem of establishing confidence levels of the population from the data provided by a random sample is strictly



a problem in *classical* random sampling theory because the relevant operators all commute with each other. See subsection 3.3 for details.

It should be apparent that Gottesman-Preskill's reformulation of Shor-Preskill's proof and its accompanying analysis of classical statistics carry over to our efficient QKD scheme, provided that we employ the prescribed refined data analysis.

Let us now give more details of the argument that the sample (bit-flip and phase) error rates provide good estimates of the population (bit-flip and phase) error rates. It is simpler to take the limit of  $N$  goes to infinity. In this case, the classical de Finetti's representation theorem applies [16]. The de Finetti's theorem states that the number,  $r_1$ , of phase errors in the test sample of  $m_1$  photons is given by:

$$p(r_1, m_1) = \binom{m_1}{r_1} \int_0^1 z^{r_1} (1-z)^{m_1-r_1} P_\infty^1(z) dz \quad (32)$$

for some 'probability of probabilities' (i.e., a non-negative function,  $P_\infty^1$ ). Physically, it means that one can imagine that each photon is generated by some unknown independent, identical distribution that is chosen with a probability,  $P_\infty^1(z)$ .

Similarly, for the bit-flip errors, its number,  $r_2$ , in the test sample of  $m_2$  photons is given by:

$$p(r_2, m_2) = \binom{m_2}{r_2} \int_0^1 z^{r_2} (1-z)^{m_2-r_2} P_\infty^2(z) dz \quad (33)$$

for some 'probability of probabilities',  $P_\infty^2(z) dz$ .

We are interested in the case of a finite population size,  $N$ . Fortunately, a similar expression still exists[37, 51, 35] and it can be written in terms of hypergeometric functions:

$$p(r_2, m_2) = \sum_{n=r_2}^{N-m_2+r_2} [C(m_2, r_2) C(N-m_2, n-r_2) / C(N, n)] P(n, N) \quad (34)$$

where  $C(a, b)$  is the number of ways of choosing  $b$  objects from  $a$  objects and  $P(n, M)$  is the 'probability of probabilities'.

An upper bound, which will be sufficient for our purposes, can be found in the following Lemma.

**Lemma 1.** Suppose one is given a population of  $n_{\text{total}}$  balls out of which  $pn_{\text{total}}$  of them are white and the rest are black. One then picks  $n_{\text{test}}$  balls

randomly and uniformly from this population *without replacement*. Then, the probability of getting at most  $\lfloor \lambda n_{\text{test}} \rfloor$  white balls,  $Pr_{\text{wr}}(X < \lfloor \lambda n_{\text{test}} \rfloor)$ , satisfies the inequality

$$Pr_{\text{wr}}(X \leq \lfloor \lambda n_{\text{test}} \rfloor) < 2^{-n_{\text{test}} \{A(\lambda, p) - n_{\text{test}} / [(n_{\text{total}} - n_{\text{test}}) \ln 2]\}} \quad (35)$$

provided that  $n_{\text{test}} > 1$  and  $0 \leq \lambda < p$ , where

$$A(\lambda, p) = -H(\lambda) - \lambda \log_2 p - (1 - \lambda) \log_2(1 - p) \quad (36)$$

with  $H(\lambda) \equiv -\lambda \log_2 \lambda - (1 - \lambda) \log_2(1 - \lambda)$  being the well-known binary entropy function.

Furthermore,  $A(\lambda, p) \geq 0$  whenever  $0 \leq \lambda \leq p < 1$  and the equality holds if and only if  $\lambda = p$ .

*Proof:* We denote the probability of getting exactly  $j$  white balls by  $Pr_{\text{wr}}(X = j)$ . Clearly,

$$\begin{aligned} & Pr_{\text{wr}}(X = j) \\ &= \frac{\binom{n_{\text{test}}}{j} (pn_{\text{total}} - j + 1)_j ([1 - p]n_{\text{total}} - n_{\text{test}} + j + 1)_{n_{\text{test}} - j}}{(n_{\text{total}} - n_{\text{test}} + 1)_{n_{\text{test}}}}, \end{aligned} \quad (37)$$

where  $(x)_j \equiv x(x + 1)(x + 2) \cdots (x + j - 1)$ . Eq. (37) is called the hypergeometric distribution whose properties have been studied in great detail. In particular,

Sródka showed that [56]

$$\begin{aligned} Pr_{\text{wr}}(X = j) &< \binom{n_{\text{test}}}{j} p^j (1 - p)^{n_{\text{test}} - j} \left(1 - \frac{n_{\text{test}}}{n_{\text{total}}}\right)^{-n_{\text{test}}} \times \\ &\quad \left[1 + \frac{6n_{\text{test}}^2 + 6n_{\text{test}} - 1}{12n_{\text{total}}}\right]^{-1} \\ &< \binom{n_{\text{test}}}{j} p^j (1 - p)^{n_{\text{test}} - j} \left(1 - \frac{n_{\text{test}}}{n_{\text{total}}}\right)^{-n_{\text{test}}} \end{aligned} \quad (38)$$

whenever  $n_{\text{test}} > 1$ .

Consequently,

$$Pr_{\text{wr}}(X \leq \lfloor \lambda n_{\text{test}} \rfloor) \quad (39)$$

$$< \left(1 - \frac{n_{\text{test}}}{n_{\text{total}}}\right)^{-n_{\text{test}}} \sum_{j=0}^{\lfloor \lambda n_{\text{test}} \rfloor} \binom{n_{\text{test}}}{j} p^j (1-p)^{n_{\text{test}}-j} \quad (40)$$

$$< \left(1 - \frac{n_{\text{test}}}{n_{\text{total}}}\right)^{-n_{\text{test}}} 2^{n_{\text{test}}[H(\lambda) + \lambda \log_2 p + (1-\lambda) \log_2 (1-p)]} \quad (41)$$

$$< 2^{-n_{\text{test}}\{-H(\lambda) - \lambda \log_2 p - (1-\lambda) \log_2 (1-p) - n_{\text{test}}/[(n_{\text{total}} - n_{\text{test}}) \ln 2]\}} \quad (42)$$

whenever  $0 \leq \lambda < p$ . Note that we have used the inequality in [52] to obtain Eq. (41) and the inequality  $-\frac{x}{1-x} \leq \ln(1-x) \leq -x \leq 0$  to obtain Eq. (42) respectively. Hence, Eq. (35) holds.

Finally we want to show that  $A(\lambda, p) \geq 0$  whenever  $0 \leq \lambda \leq p < 1$ ; and the equality holds if and only if  $\lambda = p$ . This fact follows directly from the observations that  $A(\lambda, \lambda) = 0$ ,  $\partial A / \partial p \geq 0$  whenever  $0 \leq \lambda \leq p < 1$  and the equality holds if and only if  $\lambda = p$ . Q.E.D.

Note that Lemma 1 gives a precise bound, not just an approximation. The upshot of Lemma 1 is that the probability that the sample mean deviates from the population mean by any arbitrary but fixed non-zero amount can be shown to be *exponentially* small in  $n_{\text{test}}$ , as discussed in subsection 4.5. In effect, Lemma 1 gives the conditional probability,  $\varepsilon_1$ , that the signal quality check stage is passed, given that more than  $t \equiv \lfloor (d-1)/2 \rfloor$  out of the  $n$  pairs of shared entangled particles between Alice and Bob are in error. We will choose  $n_{\text{test}} = m_1 = m_2$  in our Protocol E.

### 5.3 Bounding fidelity

Given any eavesdropping strategy that will pass the verification test with a probability,  $\varepsilon_2$ , it is important to obtain a bound on the fidelity of the recovered state as  $k$  EPR pairs, after quantum error correction and quantum privacy amplification. We have the following Theorem.

**Theorem 3. (Adapted from [44])** Suppose Alice and Bob perform a stabilizer-based EPP-based QKD and, for the verification test, randomly sample along at least two of the three bases,  $X$  and  $Y$  and  $Z$  and compute their error rates. Suppose further that the CSS code used in the signal privacy amplification stage acts on  $n$  imperfect pairs of qubits to distill out  $k$  pairs of qubits. Given any fixed but arbitrary eavesdropping strategy by Eve, define the following probabilities:

$$p = P(\text{EPP succeeds}), \quad (43)$$

$$\varepsilon_1 = P(\text{verification passed} \mid \text{EPP fails}), \quad (44)$$

and

$$\bar{\varepsilon}_1 = P(\text{verification failed} \mid \text{EPP succeeds}), \quad (45)$$

(In statistics language,  $\varepsilon_1$  and  $\bar{\varepsilon}_1$  are the type I and II errors respectively.) Then, for any Eve's cheating strategy whose probability of passing the verification test is greater than  $\varepsilon_2$ , the fidelity of the remaining untested shared entangled state immediately after the quantum privacy amplification is greater than  $1 - \varepsilon_1/\varepsilon_2$ .

*Proof:* From Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, one can, indeed, apply classical arguments to the problem by assigning classical probabilities to the  $N$ -Bell-basis states. Given any fixed but arbitrary eavesdropping strategy, the fidelity of the remaining untested entangled state is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} F &\geq \frac{P(\text{verification passed and EPP succeeds})}{P(\text{verification passed})} \\ &= \frac{P(\text{EPP succeeds})P(\text{verification passed} \mid \text{EPP succeeds})}{P(\text{EPP succeeds})P(\text{verification passed} \mid \text{EPP succeeds}) + P(\text{EPP fails})P(\text{verification passed} \mid \text{EPP fails})} \\ &= \frac{P(\text{EPP succeeds})P(\text{verification passed} \mid \text{EPP succeeds})}{P(\text{EPP succeeds})P(\text{verification passed} \mid \text{EPP succeeds}) + P(\text{EPP fails})P(\text{verification passed} \mid \text{EPP fails})} \\ &= \frac{p(1 - \bar{\varepsilon}_1)}{p(1 - \bar{\varepsilon}_1) + (1 - p)\varepsilon_1} \\ &\geq 1 - \frac{\varepsilon_1}{p(1 - \bar{\varepsilon}_1) + (1 - p)\varepsilon_1}, \end{aligned}$$

Now, for any Eve's cheating strategy whose probability of passing the verification test is greater than  $\varepsilon_2$ , we have  $p(1 - \bar{\varepsilon}_1) + (1 - p)\varepsilon_1 > \varepsilon_2$  and, hence, from Eq. (46),

$$F > 1 - \frac{\varepsilon_1}{\varepsilon_2}. \quad (47)$$

This completes the proof of Theorem 3.

Q.E.D.

## 5.4 Summary of the proof

We will now put all the pieces together and show that a rigorous proof of security is possible with the number of test particles,  $m_1 = m_2 = n_{\text{test}}$ , scaling logarithmically with the length  $k$  of the final key. Consequently, the bias in an efficient BB84 scheme can be chosen such that  $N(p^2 - \delta') = n_{\text{test}}$

for a small  $\delta$ . In other words,  $p = O(\sqrt{(\log k)/N})$ , which goes to zero as  $N$  goes to infinity.

Given a signal quality check that involves only  $n_{test}$  photons, from Lemma 1, we see that the conditional probability,  $\varepsilon_1$ , that the signal quality check stage is passed, given that more than  $t \equiv \lfloor (d-1)/2 \rfloor$  out of the  $n$  pairs of shared entangled particles between Alice and Bob are in error is exponentially small in  $n_{test}$ . i.e.,

$$\varepsilon_1 = O(2^{-n_{test}\alpha}), \quad (48)$$

for some positive constant  $\alpha$ .

Let Alice and Bob pick a security parameter,

$$\varepsilon_2 = 2^{-u}, \quad (49)$$

and consider only eavesdropping strategies that will pass the signal quality check with a probability at least  $\varepsilon_2$ . We require that

$$\varepsilon = \frac{\varepsilon_1}{\varepsilon_2} \ll 1. \quad (50)$$

Recall from Theorem 3 that for any eavesdropping strategy that will pass the signal quality check test with a probability at least  $\varepsilon_2$ , has its fidelity bounded by  $1 - \varepsilon$ . i.e.,

$$F \geq 1 - \varepsilon. \quad (51)$$

Now, from Theorem 2, the eavesdropper's mutual information with the final key is bounded by

$$I_{eve}^{Bound} = \varepsilon(2k + \log_2(1/\varepsilon) + \frac{1}{\log_e 2}). \quad (52)$$

Consider a fixed but arbitrary value of  $I_{eve}^{Bound}$ , the constraint on the eavesdropper's mutual information on the final key: i.e.,

$$I_{eve}^{Bound} = 2^{-s}, \quad (53)$$

where  $s$  is a positive security parameter. In the large  $k$  limit, Eq. (52) implies that

$$\varepsilon = O(2^{-s}/k). \quad (54)$$

Substituting Eq. (50) into Eq. (54), we see that

$$\frac{k\varepsilon_1}{2^{-s}\varepsilon_2} = O(1). \quad (55)$$

Substituting Eqs. (48) and (49) into Eq. (55), we find that

$$\frac{k2^{-n_{test}\alpha}}{2^{-(u+s)}} = O(1). \quad (56)$$

Now, for fixed but arbitrary values of the security parameters,  $s$  and  $u$ , we see that, in fact, the number of test photons,  $n_{test}$ , is required to scale only as  $O(\log k)$ , i.e., the logarithm of the final key length. Consequently, the only constraint on the bias  $p$  is that there are enough photons for performing the verification test. This gives rise to the requirement that  $N(p^2 - \delta') = n_{test} = O(\log k)$ , i.e.,

$$p = O(\sqrt{(\log k)/N}). \quad (57)$$

This completes our proof of security of Protocol E, an efficient QKD scheme. We remark that the error correction and privacy amplification procedure in Protocol E are exactly the same as in Shor-Preskill's proof.

As a side remark, if one insists that the eavesdropper's information is exponentially small in  $N$ , then one can take  $s = cN$ , for some positive constant,  $c$ . From Eq. (56), this will require  $n_{test}$  to be proportional to  $N$ . A number of earlier papers make such an assumption. However, in this paper, we note that this requirement can be relaxed. For instance, it is consistent to pick  $s = cN^{a'}$  where  $0 \leq a' \leq 1$ . In this more general case, we have from Eq. (56) that asymptotically  $\alpha n_{test} \sim cN^{a'}$ . Consequently,

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha N p^2 &\geq \alpha n_{test} \sim cN^{a'} \\ p^2 &= \Omega\left(\frac{cN^{a'-1}}{\alpha}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (58)$$

From Eq. (58), it is clear that for all values of  $a' \in [0, 1]$ , the probability  $p$  can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, but non-zero. This completes our analysis for the security of an efficient QKD scheme where each of Alice and Bob picks the two polarization bases with probabilities  $p$  and  $1 - p$ .

## 6 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we presented a new quantum key distribution scheme and proved its unconditional security against the most general attacks allowed by quantum mechanics.

In BB84, each of Alice and Bob chooses between the two bases (rectilinear and diagonal) with equal probability. Consequently, Bob's measurement basis differs from that of Alice's half of the time. For this reason, half of the polarization data are useless and are thus thrown away immediately. We have presented a simple modification that can essentially double the efficiency of BB84. There are two important ingredients in this modification. The first ingredient is for each of Alice and Bob to assign significantly different probabilities (say  $\varepsilon$  and  $1 - \varepsilon$  respectively where  $\varepsilon$  is small but non-zero) to the two polarization bases (rectilinear and diagonal respectively). Consequently, they are much more likely to use the same basis. This decisively enhances efficiency.

However, an eavesdropper may try to break such a scheme by eavesdropping mainly along the predominant basis. To make the scheme secure against such a biased eavesdropping attack, it is crucial to have the second ingredient — a refined error analysis — in place. The idea is the following. Instead of lumping all the accepted polarization data into one set and computing a *single* error rate (as in BB84), we divide up the data into various subsets according to the actual polarization bases used by Alice and Bob. In particular, the *two* error rates for the cases 1) when both Alice and Bob use the rectilinear basis and 2) when both Alice and Bob use the diagonal basis, are computed separately. It is only when both error rates are small that they accept the security of the transmission.

We then prove the security of efficient QKD scheme, not only against the specific attack mentioned above, but also against the most general attacks allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics. In other words, our new scheme is *unconditionally* secure. Moreover, just like the standard BB84 scheme, our protocol can be implemented without a quantum computer. The maximal tolerable bit error rate is 11%, the same as in Shor and Preskill's proof. If we allow Eve to get a fixed but arbitrarily small amount of information on the final key, then the number of test particles,  $n_{test}$ , is required only to scale logarithmically with the length  $k$  of the final key. Consequently, the bias in an efficient BB84 scheme can be chosen such that  $N(p^2 - \delta') = n_{test}$  for a small  $\delta$  and where  $N$  is the total number of photons transmitted. In other words,

$p = O(\sqrt{(\log k)/N})$ , which goes to zero as  $N$  goes to infinity. More generally, suppose we pick the security parameter to be  $s$  (for an eavesdropper's information  $I_{eve} \leq 2^{-s}$ ) such that  $s = cN^{a'}$  where  $0 \leq a' \leq 1$ . We find that this can be achieved by testing  $n_{test}$  random photons where  $\alpha n_{test} \sim cN^{a'}$ . Furthermore, each of Alice and Bob may pick the two polarization bases with probabilities  $p$  and  $1 - p$  such that  $p^2 = \Omega(\frac{cN^{a'-1}}{\alpha})$ . Therefore,  $p$  can, indeed, be made arbitrarily small but non-zero.

This is the first time that a single-particle quantum key distribution scheme has been proven to be secure without relying on a symmetry argument — that the two bases are chosen randomly and uniformly. Our proof is a generalization of Shor and Preskill's proof [55] of security of BB84, a proof that in turn built on earlier proofs by Lo and Chau [44] and also by Mayers [49].

We remark that our idea of efficient schemes of quantum key distribution applies also to other schemes such as Biham, Huttner and Mor's scheme [11] which is based on quantum memories. Our idea also applies the six-state scheme [13], which has been shown rigorously to tolerate a higher error rate of up to 12.7% [40].

As a side remark, Alice and Bob may use different biases in their choices of probabilities. In other words, our idea still works if Alice chooses between the two bases with probabilities  $\varepsilon$  and  $1 - \varepsilon$  and Bob chooses with probabilities  $\varepsilon'$  and  $1 - \varepsilon'$  where  $\varepsilon \neq \varepsilon'$ .

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*Notes Added:* An entanglement-based scheme with an efficiency greater than 50% has also been discussed in a recent preprint by two of us (H.-K. Lo and H.F. Chau) [44]. Recent proofs of the unconditional security of various QKD schemes have been provided by H. Inamori [31, 32], H. Aschauer and H. J. Briegel [1] and by D. Gottesman and J. Preskill [28]. Recently, it has been shown [26] by D. Gottesman and one of us (H.-K. Lo) that two-way classical communications can be used to increase substantially the maximal tolerable bit error rate in BB84 and the six-state scheme. The result presented in the current paper can be combined with [26] to obtain, for example, an efficient BB84 scheme that can tolerate a substantially higher bit error rate (say, 18.9 percent) than in Shor-Preskill's proof. It has been shown in a recent preprint [27] that even imperfect devices can provide perfect security in QKD within the entanglement purification approach employed in the present paper. Finally, a proof of the unconditional security of another well-known QKD scheme, B92 scheme published by Bennett in 1992 [2], has recently been presented [58].

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